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Richard MACKENSWORTH*
V.
AMERICAN TRADING TRANSPORTATION CO.
Civ. A. No. 73-943.
United States District Court,
E. D. Pennsylvania.
Nov. 19, 1973.
A seaman, with help of legal sages,
Sued a shipowner for his wages.
The defendant, in New York City
(Where served was process without pity)
Thought the suit should fade away,
Since it was started in Pa.
The District Court there (Eastern District)
Didn't feel itself restricted
And in some verse by Edward R. Becker, J.,
Let the sailor have his day.
The owner, once to earn freight fare,
Sent ship to load on Delaware.
Since it came to reap in port,
T'was turnabout to show in court,
With process so to profit tied.
Motion to dismiss denied.
1. Process 62
Long-arm service is a procedural tool
Founded upon a "doing business" rule.
42 Pa. S. § 8309.
2. Courts 12(2)
A New York shipowner which, to its later
dismay
Loaded a ship in Philly, Pa.
In the year of Our Lord 1972
Could be served in a suit there by seafarer
who
Claimed that his wages were long overdue,
Since the loading, in the learned court's ken
of it
Was a single act done for pecuniary benefit
And thus doing business (for profit to boot)
Within the state's long-arm statute.
46 U.S.C.A. § 594; 42 Pa. S. § 8309(a)(3).
3. Courts 12(2)
Under the Commonwealth statute providing
That in cases of persons elsewhere residing,
"The doing of a single act * 0 * for the
purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary
benefit or otherwise accomplishing an
object with the intention of initiating
a series of such acts."
No future intention is needed
When "pecuniary profit" is heeded;
One acting from profit ambition
Need not contemplate repetition.
42 Pa. S. § 8309(a)(3).
4. Courts 12(2)
Lest the long-arm statute make all nervous
It was amended to avoid guess
And to extend long-arm service
To the full reach of due process.
42 Pa. S. § 8309.
5. Constitutional Law 305(6)
A New York shipowner who
Once sent its vessel over the blue
For loading in Philly, in '72
Could be sued there, to its rue
In accord with process due
Under International Shoe.
* Reprinted with permission from 367
Publishing Company.
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Cohen & Lore, Harry Lore, Philadelphia,
Pa., for plaintiff.
Krusen, Evans & Byrne, E. Alfred Smith,
T. J. Mahoney, H. Wallace Roberts,
Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
EDWARD R. BECKER, District Judge.
The motion now before us
has stirred up a terrible fuss.
And what is considerably worse,
it has spawned some preposterous doggerel
verse.
The plaintiff, a man of the sea,
after paying his lawyer a fee,
filed a complaint of several pages
to recover statutory wages.1
The pleaded facts remind us of a tale that
is endless.
A seaman whom for centuries
the law has called "friendless"
is discharged from the ship before voyage's
end
and sues for lost wages, his finances to mend.
The defendant shipping company's office is
based in New York City,
and to get right down to the nitty gritty,
it has been brought to this Court by long
arm service,2
which has made it extremely nervous.
[1] Long arm service is a procedural tool
founded upon a "doing business" rule.
But defendant has no office here, and says it
has no mania
to do any business in Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff found defendant had a ship here in
June '72,
but defendant says that ship's business is
through.
Asserting that process is amiss,
1. In nautical terms, the wage statute is
stowed
at § 594 of 46 U.S. Code.
2. Long arm service is effected, not by
stealth,
but through the Secretary of the Com-
monwealth.
it has filed a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's counsel, whose name is Harry
Lore,
read defendant's brief and found it a bore.
Instead of a reply brief, he acted pretty
quick
and responded with a clever limerick:
"Admiralty process is hoary
With pleadings that tell a sad story
Of Libels in Rem-
The bane of sea-faring men
The moral:
Better personally served than be
sorry."
Not to be outdone, the defense took the
time
to reply with their own clever rhyme.
The defense counsel team of Mahoney,
Roberts, & Smith
drafted a poem cutting right to the pith:
"Admiralty lawyers like Harry
Both current and those known from
lore
Be they straight types, mixed or fairy
Must learn how to sidestep our bore.
For Smith, not known for his mirth
With his knife out for Mackensworth
With Writs, papers or Motions to
Quash
Knows that dear Harry's position
don't wash."
Overwhelmed by this outburst of pure
creativity,
we determined to show an equal proclivity.
Hence this opinion in the form of verse,
even if not of the calibre of Saint-John
Perse.
The first question is whether, under the
facts,
defendant has done business here to come
under Pennsylvania's long arm acts.3
If we find that it has, we must reach ques-
tion two,
whether that act so applied is constitutional
3. Designed to relieve the plaintiff's service
burdens,
Pennsylvania's latest long arm law may
be found at § 8309 of 42 Purdon's.
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under Washington v. International
Shoe.4
Defendant runs a ship known as the SS
Washington Trader,
whose travels plaintiff tracked as GM is said
to have followed Nader.
He found that in June '72 that ship rested
its keel
and took on a load of cargo here which was
quite a big business deal.
[2] In order for extraterritorial jurisdiction
to obtain,
it is enough that defendant do a single act
in Pa. for pecuniary gain.
And we hold that the recent visit of de-
fendant's ship to Philadelphia's port
is doing business enough to bring it before
this Court.
[3] We note, however, that the amended act's
grammar 5
is enough to make any thoughtful lawyer
stammer.
The particular problem which deserves
mention
is whether a single act done for pecuniary
gain also requires a future intention.
[4] As our holding suggests, we believe the
answer is no,
and feel that is how the Pa. appellate cases
will go.
4. That decision of the Supreme Court of
Courts
may be found at page 310 of 326 U.S.
Reports. [66 S.Ct. 154, 90 LEd. 95]
5. The words of the statute are overly terse,
still we will quote them, though not in
verse:
(a) General rule.-Any of the following
shall constitute "doing business" for the
purpose of this chapter:
(2) The doing of a single act in this
Commonwealth for the purpose of thereby
realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise
accomplishing an object with the inten-
tion of initiating a series of such acts.
(3) The shipping of merchandise di-
rectly or indirectly into or through this
Commonwealth.
42 Pa. S. § 8309.
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Further, concerning § (a)(3)'s "shipping of
merchandise"
the future intention doctrine has already
had its demise.6
We do not yet rest our inquiry, for as is a
judge's bent,
we must look to see if there is precedent.?
And we found one written in '68 by three
big wheels
on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
The case, a longshoreman's personal injury
suit,
is Kane v. USSR,
and it controls the case at bar.
It's a case with which defendants had not
reckoned,
and may be found at page 131 of 394 F.2d.
In Kane, a ship came but once to pick up
stores
and hired as agents to do its chores a firm
of local stevedores.
Since the Court upheld service on the
agents,
the case is nearly on all fours,
and to defendant's statutory argument
Kane closes the doors.
Despite defendant's claim that plaintiff's
process is silly,
there have been three other seamen's actions
against defendant, with service in
Philly.
And although they might have tried to get
the service corrected,
the fact of the matter is they've never ob-
jected.8
6. See Aquarium Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Industrial Pressing and Packaging (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
Prospects for suit on a single goods ship-
ment are decidedly greener
because of the Aquarium decision of
Judge Charles R. Weiner,
holding that, in a goods shipment case no
future intention is needed;
the message of Aquarium we surely have
heeded.
Anyone who wishes to look Aquarium
up can find it at p. 441 of 358 F.Supp.
7. We thus reject the contention that
one of the judicial vices
is too much reliance on stare decisis.
8. Berrios v. American Trading & Produc-
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[5] We turn then to the constitutional point,
and lest the issue come out of joint,
it is important that one thought be first
appended:
the reason the long arm statute was
amended.
The amendment's purpose was to eliminate
guess
and to extend long arm service
to the full reach of due process.9
And so we now must look to the facts
to see if due process is met by sufficient
"minimum contacts."10
The visit of defendant's ship is not yet very
old,
and so we feel constrained, to hold
tion Co. (AT&P) (defendant's predeces-
sor). C.A. 68-47;
Gibson v. AT&P, C.A. 68-1466.
And in Battles v. AT&P., C.A. 73-102,
in this very annum,
service on the Secretary of the Common-
wealth
was authorized by Judge John B. Han-
num.
9. See Aquarium Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. In-
dustrial Pressing & Packaging, supra, at
444.
10. See International Shoe v. State of Wash-
ington, supra, at 316.
that under traditional notions of substantial
justice and fair play,1
defendant's constitutional argument does
not carry the day.
This Opinion has now reached its final
border,
and the time has come to enter an Order,
which, in a sense, is its ultimate crux,
but alas, plaintiff claims under a thousand
bucks.
So, while trial counsel are doubtless in fine
fettle,
with many fine fish in their trial kettle,
we urge them not to test their mettle,
because, for the small sum involved, it
makes more sense to settle.
In view of the foregoing Opinion, at this
time
we enter the following Order, also in
rhyme.
ORDER
Finding that service of process is bona fide,
the motion to dismiss is hereby denied.
So that this case can now get about its ways,
defendant shall file an answer within 21
days.
11. See id.
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